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  The principle of the budgetary discipline, compulsory for the Spanish regions by 
the Law 18/2001, December 12th [General Law of Budgetary Stability] and the Organic 
Law 5/2001, December 13th, complementary to the former one, established in the frame 
of the European Agreement for Stability and Growth, can generate conflicting situations 
with those Spanish regions which investment capacity depends on external borrowing.  
  This paper deals with the corresponding relative position of the different regions, 
according to its investment capacity, using for that purpose a simulation exercise, in 
which we advance the budgetary stability constraint for the period 1997-2000.   
  In this paper, the public financial activity is treated, for each region, through 
different public revenue and expenditure ratios per capita. This situation leads to 
consider a multicriteria Promethee method as the apropriate one to obtain a global 
ranking for all of them. 
  In the opinion of Al-Shemmeri, Al-Kloub and Rearman (1997), this method is 
the most adequate one because of the following advantages: public authorities, as 
decision takers,  can understand easily the results, regardless the  knowledge they may 
have about it; the method uses understandable economic parameters; the method avoids 
distorting scale effects  among different alternatives and, as well, makes possible the  
deviation evaluation between  alternatives and, finally, allows for sensibility analysis.  
 
 
   2
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Stability and Growth Pact which was approved at the meeting of the 
European Union Council held in Amsterdam in June 1997, indicates fighting public 
deficit as the primordial economic policy objective of the states signing the pact. 
This commitment forms part of the Spanish internal legal system, through the 
enactment of Law 18/2001, dated 12th December 2001, on General Budgetary Stability 
and its complementary Organic Law, extending the scope of the stability objective to 
the Territorial Administration sector.  
Due to the fact that the Public Sector cannot incur public deficit, it must perform 
budgetary adjustments by either increasing taxes (which is not a particularly feasible 
option given the considerable existing tax pressure and the unpopular nature of this 
measure), or by reducing expenses, preferably capital expenses, since these are more 
flexible to reduce than current expenses
1. 
As a result of the above, it seems likely there will be a conflict between the 
budgetary stability objective imposed by financial orthodoxy and investment potential 
in Public Administration, represented by capital expenses. 
The present study has been conducted on the budgetary stability – investment 
capacity binomial of the 17 Autonomous Communities (CCAA) and the Autonomous 
Cities of Ceuta and Melilla (CDAA), based on the assumption of preparing for the zero 
deficit condition during a 4-year period (1997-2000), using the multi-criteria Promethee 
method in order to provide information on the relative situation of each of these regions 
within the scenario described.  
To achieve the purpose indicated above, the study has been divided into the 
following sections: introduction, methodology, empirical analysis, conclusions, 
appendix including a net flows diagram and sensitivity analysis and references. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Description of variables
2.   
- PERSONNEL EXPENSES (PEX): Salaries paid by the Public Sector to civil servants 
and personnel recruited.  
- CURRENT EXPENSES IN GOODS AND SERVICES (CEX): Expenses arising from 
exercising current activities in the Public Sector.   
                                                 
1 De Haan et al (1996). 
2 Aggregate values: 1997-2000.    3
- FINANCIAL EXPENSES (FEX): Credits which are necessary to satisfy the financial 
burden of public liabilities. 
- CURRENT TRANSFERS MADE (CTM): Non-compensated payments made for the 
purpose of financing current transactions.  
- REAL INVESTMENT (RINV): Expenses used to create or acquire capital assets.  
- CAPITAL TRANSFERS MADE (KTM): Non-compensated payments made for the 
purpose of financing capital transactions.  
- DIRECT TAXATION (DITAX): Basically income and capital gains tax. 
- INDIRECT TAXATION (INTAX): Basically sales tax.  
- FEES, PUBLIC PRICES AND OTHER INCOME (FPP): Monetary compensation and 
income arising basically from the sale of public goods and services.  
- CURRENT TRANSFERS RECEIVED (CTR): Non-compensated resources received 
by the Public Sector for financing current transactions. 
- CAPITAL INCOME (KI): Income arising from public estate or capital income.  
-DIVESTING OF EFFEECTIVE INVESTMENTS (DEINV): Income arising from the 
sale of public capital assets. 
- CAPITAL TRANSFERS RECEIVED (KTR): Non-compensated resources received 
by the Public Sector for financing capital transactions. 
-GROSS SAVINGS (GS): Current (Income – Expenses).  
- CAPITAL BALANCE (KS): Capital (Income – Expenses).  
- NON-FINANCIAL DEFICIT OR SURPLUS (DEF/SURP): GS + KS.  
- CAPITAL EXPENSES FINANCED BY NET INDEBTEDNESS (KEfind): Capital 
transactions financed through the reduction of assets or the increase of financial 
liabilities.  
- FINANCIAL SAVINGS (FS): Less financial expenses arising from budgetary 
balancing restrictions.  
-REDUCTION IN CAPITAL EXPENSES UNDER BUDGETARY STABILITY 
(∇KEbst): Reduction in capital transactions resulting from non-incurrence of debt. 
 
  The budgetary stability alternatives are:  
¾  Increasing taxes, and/or,   4
¾  Reducing public expense, as defended by González-Páramo
3. Basically, capital 
expenses are those most affected by cuts, due to reasons of political visibility
4 
and because they are more flexible
5, compromising the productive capacity of 
the economic system. 
  
  In comparing the situation in which Spanish regions would find themselves 
within this hypothetical scenario, we are raising the issue of putting into some kind of 
order a series of alternatives (CCAA, CDAA) in the face of multiple criteria (Public 
Accounting ratios as defined in paragraph 2.3).  
 
2.2. The Promethee method: a multicriteria decision system.  
As we have said, in this work the public financial activity is treated, for each 
region, through different public revenue and expenditure ratios. This situation leads to 
consider a multicriteria Promethee method as the appropriated one to obtain a global 
ranking for all of them. In the opinion of Al-Shemmeri, Al-Kloub and Pearman
6, this 
method is the most adequate one because of the following advantages: public 
authorities, as decision takers, can understand easily the results, regardless the   
knowledge they may have about it; the method uses understandable economic 
parameters; the method avoids distorting scale effects  among different alternatives and, 
as well, makes possible the deviation evaluation between alternatives and, finally, 
allows for sensibility analysis.  
Actually, to decide in a multicriteria environment is difficult, because indeed 
most decision problems that arise in our daily life involve different often conflicting 
objectives that we try to satisfy simultaneously. In practice, this attempt is illusory and 
we have to consider best compromise solutions.  
So in general, we consider multicriteria decision problems of the following type:  
 
 
A is a set of n possible decisions or alternatives (finite set: Autonomous 
Communities and the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla) which are evaluated 
                                                 
3 González-Páramo J. M. (2001).   
4  Oxley, H. and Martín, M. (1991) 
5 De Haan et al (1996). 
6 Al-Shemmeri, T., Al-Kloub, B. and Pearman, A., (1997). 
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through k criteria g1, g2.., gk. The basic data for such a problem can be presented in a 
evaluation matrix that it gives the dominance relation, based on a unanimity principle, 
can be defined as follows:  
A b a ∈ ) , ( a  dominates b iff      . ,... 2 , 1 , ) ( ) ( k h b g a g h h = ∀ ≥  (with at least one >). 
 
  The non-dominated alternatives are called efficient (or Pareto optimal) solutions. 
In practice, the dominance relation is often very poor and the number of efficient 
solutions can be rather large. Indeed, it is clear that such data do not generally induce a 
complete ranking on the set A of alternatives. The problem is not mathematically well 
stated and the notion of optimal solution does not exist. However the problem is most 
often economically well stated as it expresses the different and possibly conflicting 
objectives of the decision maker. In order to provide the decision maker with a good 
assistance a particular multicriteria methodology must be considerate, called 
PROMETHEE (means: Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichement 
Evaluations). 
  The Promethee method (and its visual associated visual modelling: The GAIA 
plane), take into account all the necessary requisites for the most multicriteria models:  
¾  The amplitude of the deviations between the evaluations of the alternatives are 
taken into account: dj (a,b) = gj (a) – gj (b).  
¾  As the criteria are generally expressed in different units, the scaling effects are 
completely eliminated.  
¾  When comparing a couple of alternatives (a,b), the multicriteria decision aid 
method, come to one of this conclusions: 
- a is preferred to b or b is preferred to a. 
- a and b are indifferent. 
-  a and b are incomparable (this circumstance, allows the method to 
avoid to decide when insufficient information is available)
7. 
¾  All the parameters have economical significance. 
¾  We can obtain different results depending on the additional information by the 
decision maker. 
¾  This method analyzes the conflicting aspects between the criteria. It is very 
important to have the opportunity to speak to the decision maker, to appreciate 
                                                 
7 Incomparability between two alternatives appears when one alternative is good on some criteria and bad 
on others, while the opposite holds for the other alternative.    6
his/her preferences, and to have a clear interpretation of the weights of the 
criteria. 
 
Then this requisite set, the Promethee method, in order to consider the 
deviations and the scales or the criteria, associates a generalized criterion to each 
criterion g(.). For this objective, we define a preference function, which is obtained 
giving the degree or preference between alternatives for the decision maker. The 
generalized criterion associated, is defined by the following pair:  
{gj(.), Pj(.,.)}, where Pj (a,b) = P j  {d j (a,b)}    M b a ∈ ∀ ,    
1 ) , ( 0 ≤ ≤ b a Pj  
To facilitate the association the generalized criterion to each criterion, in the 
classic literature
8, there are six typical generalized criteria that are proposed to the 
decision maker. The choice is made interactively by the decision maker and the analyst 
according to their preference degrees.  
When a generalized criterion has been associated to each criterion, we define, 
with all the criteria, a multicriteria preference index of a over b, like this
9:  
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Where: wj > 0 (j = 1,2,...,k), are weights associated to each criterion, according 
to its relative importance.  
If we consider how each alternative a, is facing the n-1 other ones, we can define 
the two following outranking flows:  
1.  The positive outranking flow: expresses how much each one is outranking all the 
others. The best alternative has the higher positive flow, because it represents its 










) ( π φ
 
2.  The negative outranking flow: expresses how much each alternative is outranked 
by all the others. The best alternative has the smaller negative flow, so 
represents its weakness. 
                                                 
8 Brans, J. P., (1984) (1986), Brans, J. P., and Vincke, P. H. (1985). 
9  ) , ( b a π expresses how and which degree a is preferred to b, and  ) , ( a b π how b is preferred to a, over 
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From the information about these positive and negative flows, we can deduce 
two natural rankings of the alternatives:  
1.  The PROMETHEE I PARTIAL RANKING: 
It is obtained from the pairwise comparisons and intersections: 
 
  a is preferred to b ⇔                                                                   
   
  a and b are indifferent ⇔  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( b a and b a − − + + = = φ φ φ φ  
  a and b are incomparable ⇔ otherwise  
 
2.  The PROMETHEE II COMPLETE RANKING:  
It is the balance between the positive and negative outranking flows. The higher 
net flow is the better alternative.  
) ( ) ( ) ( a a a − + − = φ φ φ  
 
The complete ranking is defined by: 
a is preferred to  b        ⇔   ) ( ) ( b a φ φ >  
a and b are indifferent  ⇔   ) ( ) ( b a φ φ =  
 
Let us notice there remain no incomparability but the resulting information is 
more disputable, because, a considerable part of the information is lost by 
considering the difference.  
 
As we have said, the Promethee method allows obtaining an important part with 
graphical information about the conflicting character of the criteria and the impact of 
the weights of the criteria on the final results. This is called GAIA visual modelling 
method (Geometrical Analysis for Interactive Assistance), and provides such 
information. It complements the rather approach of the Promethee procedure with a 
descriptive and graphically oriented analysis.  
The set of alternatives should be represented by n points in the k-dimensional 
space, but as the number of criteria is usually greater than two, it is impossible to have a 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( b a and b a − − + + < > φ φ φ φ  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( b a and b a − − + + < = φ φ φ φ  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( b a and b a − − + + = > φ φ φ φ    8
clear vision of these points. So, it is possible to define a plane in order to obtain a two 
dimensional representation of the alternatives. The GAIA plane is defined by vectors 
which represent the criteria in according by weights. 
As few information as possible get lost by projection, so a measure of the 
quantity of information being preserved, is given by δ parameter (it represents a 
percentage of the total information about the problem).  
About the GAIA plane interpretation, let us consider the projections of the unit 
vectors (of all the criteria) on the plane. These axes have different lengths and positions 
that mean a differentiation power of the criteria. The length of this vectors, is a measure 
of how much the criterion gj differentiates the alternatives (the longer vector belongs to 
the more criterion differentiates the alternatives). When two criteria expressing the same 
preferences, their vectors are oriented approximately in the same direction; while 
conflicting criteria are represented by axes having opposite directions.   
The projection on the plane of the different criteria in according to the assessed 
weights, allows a clear visualisation of the solution with the unit vector called The 
Promethee decision axis: π .If  π is short, the Promethee decision axis has no strong 
decision power, so the unit vector is nearly orthogonal to the GAIA plane
10. When this 
vector is long, the decision maker is invited to select the alternatives that are as far as 
possible in its direction.  
Moreover, each alternative has a projection in the GAIA plane, too. It is 
represented by a point that if it is located in the direction of a particular criterion axis, is 
generally a good alternative on this criterion. When the distance between two projected 
alternatives is small, is because they both are similar alternatives for the decision maker. 
The best alternatives are located in the direction of the Promethee decision axis π . 
The Promethee and GAIA methods have been implemented on personal 
computers, with several decision support systems. In this paper, we use the DECISION 
LAB 2000 program. This software allows obtaining a sensibility analysis about the 
results. A sensibility analysis is quite recommended before finalising the decision, 




We have established three different economic groups in per capita terms: 
                                                 
10 In this case, the criteria are conflicting and a good compromise should be selected near the origin.    9
a) Group I: Per capita Public Expense. 
  R1= PEX / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R2 = CEX / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R3 = FEX / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R4= CTM / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R5 = RINV / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R6 = KTM / Nº INHABITANTS 
 
  These ratios have a direct effect on budgetary stability, due to their direct 
relationship with the public deficit. In addition, R5 and R6 have a positive effect 
on the investment capacity.  
 
b) Group II: Per capita Public Income 
  R7= DITAX / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R8 = INTAX / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R9 = FPP / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R10= CTR / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R11 = KI / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R12 = DEINV / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R13 = KTR / Nº INHABITANTS 
 
  These ratios have an inverse relationship to the deficit. R13 also has a 
direct relationship with the investment capacity.  
 
c) Group III: Per capita stability 
  R14= GS / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R15 = DEF SURP / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R16 = KS / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R17=  KEfind / Nº INHABITANTS 
  R18 = FS / Nº INHABITANTS 
 R19  =  ∇KEbst  / Nº INHABITANTS 
 
These ratios (and in particular R19), synthesise the effect of budgetary stability 
on investment capacity.   10
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
3.1 Multicriteria analysis of public expense.  
  Table 1 shows the public expense data matrix. The Spanish regions are shown in 
rows and the public expense ratios in columns. 
  The most relevant ratios with higher weightings are indicated by means of an 
asterisk (*).  
RATIOS  R1 R2 R3 R4  R5  *  R6  * 
CRITERIA  min min min min max  max 
ANDALUCÍA 3,51 0,92 1,16 3,7  32,48 1,18
ARAGÓN 1,54 0,32 0,2 2,26  5,11 0,92
ASTURIAS 0,88 0,29 0,14 0,88  3,79 1,25
BALEARES 1,24 0,7 0,13 0,58  3,5 0,61
CANARIAS 4,15 1,41 0,15 2,58  9,46 1,1
CANTABRIA 1,4 0,45 0,23 1,09  4,96 1,11
CAST-MANCHA 1,21 0,3 0,11 3,91  6,52 0,91
CAST-LEÓN 1,29 0,29 0,12 2,1  43,07 0,86
CATALUÑA 2,34 1,58 0,44 4,22  9,29 0,69
COM. VALENCIANA  2,96 0,61 0,26 2,57  7,19 0,7
EXTREMADURA 0,99 0,29 0,19 2,76  5,95 1,76
GALICIA 3,36 1,2 0,32 2,76  8,95 1,3
MADRID 1,15 0,43 0,22 1,21  3,64 0,52
MURCIA 1,19 0,21 0,18 1,13  3,39 0,83
NAVARRA 4,74 1,44 0,76 6,55  15,43 2
PAÍS VASCO  2,81 2,54 0,29 2,55  8,71 0,96
LA RIOJA  1,14 0,65 0,14 1,38  4,54 1,58
CEUTA 2,21 2,01 0,18 0,9  5,62 0,21
MELILLA 2,52 3,48 0,17 0,66  8,92 0,32
 € (1997). Prepared by the authors. 
     T A B L E   1  
  R1 to R4 have been minimised, as they have a negative effect on gross savings 
and on the investment potential; R5 to R6 have been maximised due to their direct link 
with the investment capacity.  
Table 2 shows the partial order based on incoming and outgoing preferential 
flows and the total resulting order of the net flow. 
            + φ        Ranking          − φ        Ranking          φ        Ranking 
ANDALUCÍA  0,5556              6  0,4444                6  0,1111          6 
ARAGÓN   0,4762             11  0,5238              12  -0,0476         12 
ASTURIAS  0,6349              4  0,3373                4  0,2976          4 
BALEARES  0,3730             15  0,6270               16  -0,2540         16 
CANARIAS  0,5476               7  0,4524                 7  0,0952          7 
CANTABRIA  0,5278              8  0,4722                 8  0,0556          8 
CAST-MANCHA  0,5119             10  0,4881               11  0,0238        11 
CAST-LEÓN  0,6984              1  0,2778                 1  0,4206          1   11
CATALUÑA  0,3373            16  0,6548               17  -0,3175         17 
COM. VALENCIANA  0,3968            13  0,5952               14  -0,1984         14 
EXTREMADURA  0,6468              3  0,3214                2  0,3254          3 
GALICIA  0,5119            10  0,4722               9  0,0397         10 
MADRID  0,3135           1 8  0,6786             19  -0,3651          19 
MURCIA  0,4087            12  0,5635             13  -0,1548          13 
NAVARRA  0,5833              5  0,4167               5  0,1667            5 
PAÍS VASCO  0,5238              9  0,4762            1 0  0,0476            9 
LA RIOJA  0,6667              2  0,3294               3  0,3373            2 
CEUTA  0,3294            17  0,6670              18  -0,3373          18 
MELILLA  0,3770            14  0,6230              15  -0,2460           15 
Prepared by the authors. 
    TABLE  2 
Extremadura and La Rioja are not comparable, since their partial orders alternate 
with each other, something which also occurs with Galicia and the Basque Country. 
The total order puts Castilla-León first, followed by La Rioja, with Madrid last 
in the classification. Most of the regions with high levels of powers already transferred 
are among the first ten. 
 
3.2. Public income.  
  The following chart shows the income ratios (R7-R13) by columns.  
  The most relevant ratios with higher weightings are indicated by means of an 
asterisk (*).  
RATIOS R7  R8  R9  R10  R11  R12*  R13* 
CRITERIA  max  max max max max min max 
ANDALUCÍA 117,92 399,32 260,52 8.015,01 34,13  9,52 1.146,15
ARAGÓN 804,03 421,41 335,77 3.169,62 60,59  20,01 527,14
ASTURIAS 704,33 372,03 287,99 1.589,20 24,44  125,66 1.130,37
BALEARES 922,32 1.086,86 250,00 1.597,52 11,17  0,33 375,13
CANARIAS 525,91 1.887,36 565,29 5.821,20 33,18  43,24 809,55
CANTABRIA 753,88 647,32 192,13 2.321,57 17,54  12,93 1.077,17
CAST- MANCHA  96,50 333,79 228,36 5.126,94 36,55  65,33 976,05
CAST- LEÓN  574,36 337,77 280,39 3.264,20 23,30  69,91 904,61
CATALUÑA 1.017,73 743,61 379,65 6.977,08 44,15  88,12 240,92
COM. VALENCIANA  661,89 694,22 505,26 5.146,02 46,28  36,16 425,94
EXTREMADURA 131,38 220,65 234,88 4.529,04 55,20  91,81 1.559,23
GALICIA 522,63 337,06 259,37 7.069,53 17,44  77,81 899,04
MADRID 1.134,60 942,32 261,58 1.145,12 52,97  120,73 250,42
MURCIA 480,40 506,60 288,11 2.097,90 20,00  17,72 631,24
NAVARRA 6.899,89 7.953,95 436,44 419,96 182,89  73,41 298,28
PAÍS VASCO  0,00 16,14 121,84 9.571,24 64,76  22,16 181,72
LA RIOJA  811,45 561,25 409,06 2.952,96 25,37  138,99 525,50
CEUTA 222,83 3.604,46 195,50 1.921,66 39,48  1,43 15,33
MELILLA 233,81 5.635,10 254,86 1.350,80 21,25  106,18 268,06
€ (1997). Prepared by the authors.   12
     T A B L E   3  
  All the ratios are maximised due to their positive relationship with the two 
objectives, except for R12, which shows a reduction in the investment capacity.   
  Table 4 shows the partial and total orders obtained.  
               + φ                Ranking        − φ          Ranking      φ            Ranking 
ANDALUCÍA  0,6917                  1  0,3083                  1  0,3833                  1 
ARAGÓN  0,6278                  3  0,3722                  3  0,2556                  3 
ASTURIAS  0,4361                14  0,5639                15  -0,1278                 14 
BALEARES  0,5444                  7  0,4556                  7  0,0889                  7 
CANARIAS  0,6417                  2  0,3583                  2  0,2833                  2 
CANTABRIA  0,5944                  5  0,4056                  5  0,1889                  5 
CAST- MANCHA  0,4750                12  0,5250                12  -0,0500                12 
CAST- LEÓN  0,5028                  9  0,4972                  9  0,0056                  9 
CATALUÑA  0,4806                11  0,5194                11  -0,0389                11 
COM. VALENCIANA  0,6056                  4  0,3944                  4  0,2111                  4 
EXTREMADURA  0,4944                10  0,5056                10  -0,0111                10 
GALICIA  0,4389                13   0,5611                14   -0,1222                13  
MADRID  0,3694                18  0,6306                18  -0,2611                18 
MURCIA  0,5278                  8  0,4722                  8  0,0556                  8 
NAVARRA  0,5556                  6  0,4444                  6  0,1111                  6 
PAÍS VASCO  0,3750                17   0,6250                17   -0,2500                17  
LA RIOJA  0,4056                16  0,5944                16  -0,1889                16 
CEUTA  0,4472                15  0,5528                13  -0,1056                15 
MELILLA  0,2861                19  0,7139                19  -0,4278                19 
Prepared by the authors. 
     T A B L E   4  
  Andalucia occupies the first position and Melilla the last. Despite the fact that it 
is fully autonomous in financial terms, the Basque Country is last but one, with a 
negative net flow due to its weakness as compared to the other regions.   
   
3.3. Budgetary stability.  
Table 5 shows the variables most directly linked to budgetary stability.  
  The most relevant ratios with higher weightings are indicated by means of an 
asterisk (*).  
RATIOS  R14  R15  R16  R17 *  R18  R19 * 
CRITERIA  max max max min max min 
ANDALUCÍA 433,55 -6,59 -440,14 36,03 3,64  32,40
ARAGÓN 661,15 -68,19 -729,12 104,52 9,21  95,31
ASTURIAS 763,94 -179,08 -943,02 179,08 23,39  155,68
BALEARES 1.047,38 61,66 -985,72 13,40 3,41  10,00
CANARIAS 839,69 44,39 -795,30 7,22 1,83  5,39
CANTABRIA 980,95 -61,18 -1.042,13 103,47 6,31  97,15
CAST-MANCHA 635,02 -44,67 -679,68 44,67 5,59  39,07
CAST-LEÓN 636,27 24,49 -611,78 15,82 2,26  13,56
CATALUÑA 404,97 -47,00 -451,97 17,30 12,16  5,14
COM. VALENCIANA  245,73 -528,86 -774,58 528,86 54,27  474,58  13
EXTREMADURA 757,81 12,65 -745,16 58,20 0,00  58,20
GALICIA 708,34 -81,16 -789,50 81,16 16,76  64,39
MADRID 518,69 -14,31 -533,00 24,29 5,62  18,67
MURCIA 626,24 3,48 -622,77 8,50 2,04  6,46
NAVARRA 3.004,73 475,17 -2.529,56 0,00 0,00  0,00
PAÍS VASCO  1.655,82 529,18 -1.126,65 21,65 5,70  15,94
LA RIOJA  935,72 -230,18 -1.165,90 242,71 6,86  235,86
CEUTA 1.030,25 680,02 -350,17 0,00 0,00  0,00
MELILLA 1.141,60 -119,19 -1.260,87 392,59 17,61  374,98
  € (1997). Prepared by the authors. 
     T A B L E   5  
The variables directly related to the objectives pursued are maximised (R14, 
R15, R16 and R18) and R17  and R19 are minimised as a result of their inverse 
relationship. 
  Table 6 shows the partial and total orders.  
            + φ              Ranking      − φ         Ranking      φ          Ranking
ANDALUCÍA  0,5000           10  0,5000             10  0,0000     10 
ARAGÓN  0,3750          13  0,6250            14  -0,2500      14 
ASTURIAS  0,3264          15  0,6736            16  -0,3472      16 
BALEARES  0,6597            4  0,3403             4  0,3194       4 
CANARIAS  0,6736            3  0,3264             3  0,3472       3 
CANTABRIA  0,3611          14  0,6389            15  -0,2778      15 
CAST-MANCHA  0,4514          11  0,5486            11  -0,0972      11 
CAST-LEÓN  0,6111            8  0,3889             8  0,2222       8 
CATALUÑA  0,6528            5  0,3472             5  0,3056       5 
COM. VALENCIANA  0,1875          18  0,8125            19  -0,6250      19 
EXTREMADURA  0,4097          12  0,5764            12  -0,1667      12 
GALICIA  0,4097          12  0,5903            13  -0,1806      13 
MADRID  0,5278           9  0,4722             9  0,0556       9 
MURCIA  0,6250           7  0,3750             7  0,2500       7 
NAVARRA  0,7083           2  0,2500             2  0,4583       2 
PAÍS VASCO  0,6319           6  0,3681             6  0,2639       6 
LA RIOJA  0,2431         17  0,7569            18  -0,5139      18 
CEUTA  0,8194           1  0,1389             1  0,6806       1 
MELILLA  0,2778         16  0,7222            17  -0,4444       17 
  Prepared by the authors. 
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Ceuta  is in first position, followed by Navarre and the Canary Islands, and 
Melilla, La Rioja and the Community of Valencia are among the last. 
 
3.4. Ratio samples. 
  The most relevant ratios for the study objectives have been selected: R5, R6, 
R12, R13, R15, R17 and R19.    14
  The most relevant ratios with higher weightings are indicated by means of an 
asterisk (*).  
RATIOS  R5*  R6* R12*  R13* R15 R17* R19* 
CRITERIA  max max min max  max min max 
ANDALUCÍA 32,48 1,18 9,52 1.146,15 -6,59  36,03  32,40
ARAGÓN 5,11 0,92 20,01 527,14 -68,19  104,52  95,31
ASTURIAS 3,79 1,25 125,66 1.130,37 -179,08  179,08  155,68
BALEARES 3,50 0,61 0,33 375,13 61,66  13,40  10,00
CANARIAS 9,46 1,10 43,24 809,55 44,39  7,22  5,39
CANTABRIA 4,96 1,11 12,93 1.077,17 -61,18  103,47  97,15
CAST- MANCHA  6,52 0,91 65,33 976,05 -44,67  44,67  39,07
CAST- LEÓN  43,07 0,86 69,91 904,61 24,49  15,82  13,56
CATALUÑA 9,29 0,69 88,12 240,92 -47,00  17,30  5,14
COM. VALENCIANA  7,19 0,70 36,16 425,94 -528,86  528,86  474,58
EXTREMADURA 5,95 1,76 91,81 1.559,23 12,65  58,20  58,20
GALICIA 8,95 1,30 77,81 899,04 -81,16  81,16  64,39
MADRID 3,64 0,52 120,73 250,42 -14,31  24,29  18,67
MURCIA 3,39 0,83 17,72 631,24 3,48  8,50  6,46
NAVARRA 15,43 2,00 73,41 298,28 475,17  0,00  0,00
PAÍS VASCO  8,71 0,96 22,16 181,72 529,18  21,65  15,94
LA RIOJA  4,54 1,58 138,99 525,50 -230,18  242,71  235,86
CEUTA 5,62 0,21 1,43 15,33 680,02  0,00  0,00
MELILLA 8,92 0,32 106,18 268,06 -119,19  392,59  374,98
    € (1997). Prepared by the authors. 
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  All the ratios proposed are maximised due to their positive effect on the 
investment capacity and on budgetary discipline, with the exception of R12 and R17, 
since they show a reduction in the investment capacity and an increase in budgetary 
imbalance, respectively.   
The orders obtained are shown below.  
           + φ              Ranking        − φ         Ranking      φ          Ranking 
ANDALUCÍA  0,7422                  2 0,2578                  2  0,4844                  2
ARAGÓN  0,4111                14 0,5889                14  -0,1778                15
ASTURIAS  0,3600                15 0,6400                15  -0,2800                16
BALEARES  0,5133                10 0,4867                10  0,0267                11
CANARIAS  0,7156                  3 0,2844                  3  0,4311                  3
CANTABRIA  0,5111                11 0,4889                11  0,0222                12
CAST- MANCHA  0,5067                12 0,4933                12  0,0133                13
CAST- LEÓN  0,6511                  4 0,3489                  4  0,3022                  5
CATALUÑA  0,4689                13 0,5311                13  -0,0622                14
COM. VALENCIANA  0,2844                18 0,7156                19  -0,4311                18
EXTREMADURA  0,5689                  5 0,4311                  6  0,1378                  6
GALICIA  0,5156                  9  0,4844                  9   0,0311                10 
MADRID  0,2689                19 0,7311                18  -0,4622                19
MURCIA  0,5400                  7 0,4600                  7  0,0800                  8
NAVARRA  0,7467                  1 0,2356                  1  0,5111                  1
PAÍS VASCO  0,5356                  8  0,4644                  8   0,0711                  9 
LA RIOJA  0,2867                17 0,7133                17  -0,4267                17
CEUTA  0,5556                  6 0,4267                  5  0,1289                  7  15
MELILLA  0,3000                16 0,7000                16  0,4000                  4
Prepared by the authors. 
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Extremadura and Ceuta are not comparable, since their partial orders alternate 
with each other. Madrid and the Community of Valencia are the worst-positioned, due 
to the considerable effort made by both regions in investment and their greater sacrifice 
in achieving budgetary stability  
  Navarra is in first place (due to the fact that it is fully autonomous in financial 
terms), together with Andalucia.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
  The GAIA figure shows the results of the analysis made in the previous 
paragraph.  
 
  The vectors of criteria R15, R17 and R19 are overlapping, and thus have the 
same discriminatory effect on the alternatives. R6, R12 and R13 are more conflictive, 
since the angle formed by their vectors is the widest.    16
 Axis  π  confirms the fact that the Community of Valencia is the worst-
positioned (furthest away in the opposite direction) and Navarra is the best (as it is 
furthest away but in the same direction).  
 
APPENDIX 
  The flow figures showing the analyses made and the sensitivity tests for each 
one are shown below, for the purpose of checking the reliability and stability of the 
solutions.  
SENSIVITY TEST FOR EXPENSE RATIOS  
RATIOS STABILITY INTERVAL 
    Max. (%) Weight (%) Min.(%)
R1  8,24 7,14 5,80
R2  15,15 14,29 13,64
R3  7,65 7,14 4,88
R4  15,37 14,29 13,25
R5  29,41 28,57 28,10
R6  29,58 28,57 27,08
     
SENSIVITY TEST FOR  INCOME RATIOS  
RATIOS
STABILITY INTERVAL 
   Max. (%) Weight (%) Min.(%)
R7  10,53 10,00 9,40
R8  10,69 10,00 9,09
R9  10,99 10,00 9,17
R10  11,21 10,00 9,65
R11  10,89 10,00 8,99
R12  26,34 25,00 24,24
R13  25,62 25,00 23,81
 
SENSIVITY TEST FOR  BUDGETARY STABILITY RATIOS  
RATIOS
STABILITY INTERVAL 
   Max. (%) Weight (%) Min.(%)
R14  14,50 12,50 11,71
R15  15,66 12,50 11,11
R16  13,48 12,50 9,90
R17  27,27 25,00 20,00
R18  13,27 12,50 10,64
R19  28,00 25,00 18,92
 
SENSIVITY TEST FOR  RATIO SAMPLES  
RATIOS STABILITY INTERVAL 
   Max. (%) Weight (%) Min.(%)
R5  16,56 16,00 15,69
R6  16,33 16,00 15,74  17
R12  16,28 16,00 14,86
R13  16,37 16,00 15,63
R15  4,35 4,00 3,57
R17  16,42 16,00 15,63
R19  16,48 16,00 15,63
 
  The solutions presented are stable, since the weightings assigned are at the 
intermediate point of the stability interval.  
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